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The Landmark Law Cases and American Society series from the University Press
of Kansas has been offering high-quality materials designed for classroom use and for
general audiences since 1997.1 Beginning with volumes on gender-based affirmative
action in hiring and on a pair of cases that helped determine the legal status of rebellious
southern states and legal rights of former slaves following the Civil War and continuing
to the most recent volumes, among which are CapitalPunishmenton Trial2 and Fugitive
Slave on Trial:The Anthony Burns Case and Abolitionist Outrage,3 these texts take up

many contentious legal issues and political controversies that shaped law and politics and
impacted American political development. The series received the Scribes Award in
2008 from the American Society of Writers on Legal Subjects.
The format of each series volume is the same, including a useful chronology, case
list, and a bibliographic essay. The decision, presumably made by series editors Peter
Charles Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull, to use a bibliographic essay rather than footnotes or
endnotes is not the strongest suit of these treatments; while a bibliographic essay
provides some introduction to different themes and issues, it makes it nearly impossible
to use the book to follow up specific points or claims. Strong, curious undergraduates
and general readers wanting to dig deeper could have gotten more out of these volumes if
they had been documented in a more traditional scholarly manner. Such documentation
* The author would like to thank Kelly Schoolmeester, Swarthmore College class of 2010, for assistance
on this project.
** Richter Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
1. The first volumes in the series were Melvin I. Urofsky, Affirmative Action on Trial: Sex Discrimination
in Johnson v. Santa Clara (U. Press Kan. 1997), and Harold M. Hyman, The Reconstruction Justice of Salmon
P. Chase: In Re Turner and Texas v. White (U. Press Kan. 1997).
2. David M. Oshinsky, CapitalPunishment on Trial: Furman v. Georgia and the Death Penalty in Modern

America (U. Press Kan. 2010).
3.

Earl Maltz, Fugitive Slave on Trial:The Anthony Burns Case and Abolitionist Outrage (U. Press Kan.

2010).
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would have made it possible to determine who is contesting what or engaging whom in
debate. The volumes are, however, engaging and valuable. Generally, no prior
knowledge of the cases, the doctrines and tests employed by the Court, or the
constitutional controversies in which these cases are rooted is required, although there is
some variation on this point among the three texts reviewed.
The recent volumes considered here invite the consideration: What makes a
landmark case? A case may become the focus of unusual historical interest; it may
indeed mark some sort of turning point in the development of the law (or of a political
controversy); it may illustrate in a particularly vivid manner a continuing controversy; or
it may be a vehicle to highlight the heroic stance or constitutional vision of a specific
pivotal Justice (a role Sandra Day O'Connor performs in Barbara Perry's treatment of
Grutter v. Bollinger4 ). But a case or cluster of cases identified for "landmark" treatment
may not function like an edifice or geological formation that the traveler can count on
with certainty to guide the way. Indeed, some "landmark" cases, decided by a narrowly
divided Court, may stand only a short while. Some leave relatively weak legacies but
encourage aspirations as Furman v. Georgia5 might serve for opponents of the death
penalty. Sometimes, "landmark" cases teeter on a precipice, decided by the narrowest
margin, and possibly representing a 'last hurrah' for a particular constitutional vision, as
might arguably be the case with Grutter. After all, with Justice Samuel Alito replacing
Justice O'Connor as the swing vote in the next round of diversity-as-compelling-stateinterest-in-education issues, President Obama's new Court appointments are unlikely to
matter. Cases identified by their admirers as landmarks may, then, even be unstable
more like sandcastles at the beach than geological formations that will remain
recognizable and reliable markers for long periods.
This brings me to teleology. For some of the recent authors in the University Press
of Kansas series, the cases about which they write are situated in linear and often
progressive narratives. Or they represent heroic saves of some principle or ideal, owing
to the mettle of a specific (and highly admired) Justice. This is a kind of popular
constitutional history, to be sure, but it often suffers from what has been called a
"Whiggish narrative." 6 As the winners of constitutional battles seek to enshrine their
triumphant vision of constitutional principles and rights as the just, principled evolution
of the law, democratically supported and girded with near-holy momentum, stories about
where the Nation has been and where it is going are forged. The New Deal era Court has
been lionized, Ken Kersch argues, for expanding individual rights and liberties and for
prying the Nation loose from antiquated economic doctrines.7 Contemporary
constitutional liberalism is seen as the apotheosis of legal development; we only need to
perfect this constitutional revolution.8 In the liberal narrative, the Court plays a vital role
in forging and legitimating progressive victories in law and polity. However, since at
least the Reagan years, a regime change has been in the making, with efforts to rewrite
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5. Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American
ConstitutionalLaw 2-5 (Cambridge U. Press 2004).

7. Id
8. Id. at 4-5.
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our constitutional narrative however much liberal legal theorists would seek to deny its
legitimacy.9 Steven Teles has explored the conservative mobilization in law schools
through organizations that include the Olin Foundation, the Federalist Society, the Center
for Individual Rights, and in the judiciary, making clear how challenging it has been for
conservatives to make inroads into the dominant liberal paradigm.lo While simple,
teleological narratives are attractive to students and to those coming fresh to legal issues,
it is important to encourage these very constituencies to think critically about, and at
least pose some questions to, dominant constitutional narratives. Otherwise, battles which all of these constitutional controversies are - can be one sided. This is an issue,
although in widely varying degrees, for these three treatments of "landmark" cases.
The Landmark Law Cases series seeks out good storytelling and is very successful
in achieving that goal. The human dimension and the dramatis personae are
foregrounded. Storytelling draws in students and general readers, and these volumes
usually succeed in having audiences realize that the issues at hand are far richer and
more complex than they had imagined. But storytelling simplifies, and these volumes all
make some decisions about how to simplify. From the perspective of someone who
wants students to understand developments and complexities in constitutional law, I find
some of these decisions more successful than others. Storytelling can also stand in
tension with a goal of problematizing dominant narratives.
Some other narrative treatments designed for the classroom have done a very nice
job of exposing students to the case while telling complex legal stories. Gregg Ivers and
Kevin T. McGuire edited a nice volume, Creating Constitutional Change,11 in which
each short chapter, written by a different legal scholar, combines storytelling with
skillful teaching. Using a similar format, the Foundation Press (Thomson-West) Law
Stories series edited by Paul Caron, focused on leading cases in important areas of the
law, goes beyond parties and disputes to the legal and historical context of cases and the
impact and lasting importance of each case. Individual volumes cover a number of cases
in a specific area of law. The one I have used in the classroom, Environmental Law
Stories,12 is pitched for an audience that is somewhat more sophisticated than the
intended audience for the Kansas series - an audience with some background in law and
courts and perhaps even some exposure to law school. The chapters were tough reads for
students with modest training in American politics, policy, and law, but the narratives
can be read, even by good undergraduates, alongside other materials that treat the legal
and policy issues in a more introductory fashion. They strike a different balance between
human interest, narrative, and explanation of legal controversies and issues than does the
Kansas series.
Other conceptions for bringing cases alive in the classroom, such as the two edited

9. Id. at 5-11 (He takes especial aim at John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman.).
10. Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law
(Princeton U. Press 2008). See also Amanda Hollis-Brusky, The FederalistSociety and the Unitary Executive:
An Epistemic Community at Work (U. Cal. Berkeley Inst. Govtl. Stud. Working Paper Series, Sept. 3, 2009)
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1456598).
11. Creating ConstitutionalChange: Clashes over Power andLiberty in the Supreme Court (Gregg Ivers &
Kevin T. McGuire eds., U. Va. Press 2004) (a volume in the Constitutionalism and Democracy series).
12. EnvironmentalLaw Stories (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., Found. Press 2005).
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by Jack M. Balkin for New York University Press, assume student familiarity with and
interest in the case but model for students what it means to problematize various strands
of legal reasoning.1 3 What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said contains
some outstanding chapters; while I do not teach them all, students will get a first-rate
exposure to the ways that prominent contemporary legal scholars think about the
meaning and relevance of Brownl4 (and constitutional theory more broadly).15 Most of
the chapters are accessible to a broad audience. The highly lucid, provocative
introductory chapter by Balkin, "Brown as Icon," is required reading even in my
introductory American Politics class.16 Balkin's What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said
does the same for another landmark. 17
Mark Tushnet edited a superb reassessment of Marbury on the occasion of its
200th anniversary,18 Arguing Marbury v. Madison, beginning with the device of
rearguing the case before the bench (including a chapter by Marbury's 2003 counsel),
and continuing with perspectives on Marbury from prominent contemporary legal
scholars. 19 It, too, is a very useful classroom volume, though again, pitched at a higher
level of sophistication than is intended by the Kansas series. While there are many more
volumes and even series (e.g. the Bedford Series in History and Culture) that treat
individual cases or a number of "greatest hits" by the Court, I point only to these specific
recent efforts to bring cases and controversies to life in the classroom.
Authors of the three Landmark Law Cases volumes discussed in this article have
differing degrees of personal and professional engagement with the case histories they
examine. David Oshinsky, Jack S. Blanton Chair in History at the University of Texas
and winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Polio: An American Story,20 is an author of wideranging interests and award-winning books, including Worse Than Slavery2 1 and A
Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy.22 Oshinsky appears to have had

no particular engagement with the death-penalty issue prior to writing Capital
Punishment on Trial, but with his writings on race and the Constitution, political and
cultural conflicts in American politics, and his gift for reaching wide audiences, he was
asked to undertake the Furman study by the series editors. Barbara Perry, who sat in the
front row of the Supreme Court when the Grutter and Gratz23 decisions were announced,
is a Senior Fellow at the University of Virginia Miller Center. Author of a number of

13. See What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Most

Controversial Decision (Jack M. Balkin ed., N.Y.U. Press 2005) [hereinafter What Roe v. Wade Should Have
Said]; What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite
America 's Landmark Civil Rights Decision (Jack M. Balkin ed., N.Y.U. Press 2001) [hereinafter What Brown
v. Board of Education Should Have Said].
14. Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said, supran. 13.

16. See id at 3-28.
17. What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, supra n. 13. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

19. Arguing Marbury v. Madison (Mark Tushnet ed., Stan. U. Press 2005).
20. David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story (Oxford U. Press 2005).
21.

David M. Oshinsky, "Worse Than Slavery ": ParchmanFarm and the Ordeal ofJim Crow Justice (Free

Press 1996).
22. David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World ofJoe McCarthy (Free Press 1983).
23. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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24
books and articles on "the Supremes" and on civil rights and liberties, and coauthor
with Henry J. Abraham of Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the
United States,25 now in its eighth edition, Perry is also a natural to tell the story of
Grutterand Gratz. David A. J. Richards, Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law at New York
University School of Law, has been a longtime advocate for tolerance and rights for gay
26
and lesbian Americans. With his previous publications, Toleration and the Constitution
and Women, Gays, and the Constitution,27 recent work (with Carol Gilligan) on The
Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy,Resistance, and Democracy's Future,28 and a recently
released project on fundamentalism in American religion and law, 2 9 Richards is wellplaced to narrate the story of Bowers3 0 and Lawrence.3 1
Richards's posture as an engaged and passionate advocate in the struggle he
chronicles, however, comes through clearly in his volume, which makes The Sodomy
Cases32 a different kind of read than the other two Landmark Law Cases volumes
reviewed here. Regardless of sympathies (and contemporary students tend to be quite
sympathetic to the cause of gay marriage), this is the volume that most subscribes to the
Whiggish narrative: we (and the Court) are progressively getting it. To be fair, of the
three issues enjoined in these volumes, the case law on same-sex privacy rights, liberty
interests, and possibly even equal protections 3 3 fits more readily into a narrative of
unfolding rights protection. The ability of employers, schools, or the government to
recognize race for purposes of remedying past inequalities has been severely curtailed
and arguably brought to a halt. 34 And no sense of an "evolving standard of decency" or
vision of equal protection has eliminated capital punishment as a prerogative of states or
the federal government.35 Nevertheless, David Richards's stance gives the narrative of
Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas the feel of the inexorable unfolding of a
rights revolution nearing its apotheosis. While the sense of struggle is lively, competing
constitutional visions are not quite as well presented as in the other volumes.
Students learn best when they are engaged, and all of these treatments are likely to
get them to care. CapitalPunishment on Trial stands out for its readability; students will

24. See Barbara A. Perry, "The Supremes ': An Introduction to the U.S. Supreme Court Justices (2d ed.,

Peter Lang Publg. 2009).
25. Henry J. Abraham & Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United

States (8th ed., Oxford U. Press 1967).
26. David A. J. Richards, Tolerationand the Constitution (Oxford U. Press 1986).
27. David A. J. Richards, Women, Gays, and the Constitution: The Groundsfor Feminism and Gay Rights
in Culture and Law (U. Chi. Press 1998).
28. Carol Gilligan & David A. J. Richards, The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, and
Democracy's Future(Cambridge U. Press 2008).
29. David A. J. Richards, Fundamentalism in American Religion and Law: Obama's Challenge to
Patriarchy'sThreat to Democracy (Cambridge U. Press 2010).
30. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
31. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

32. David A. J. Richards, The Sodomy Cases: Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas (U. Press Kan.
2009).
33. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34. See e.g. Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pehia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993);
City ofRichmondv. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

35. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
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find it engaging, informative, and easy to follow.36 Oshinsky is particularly compelling
as he examines the history of the death penalty in America and its popularity in the South
as a tool of racial control. The book, too, conveys a very lively sense of death penalty
activism, litigation strategy, and the politicization of the death penalty in electoral
politics. Readers have a vivid sense not only of the views of individual Justices but how
the death penalty issue impacted relations among the Justices. The author works
carefully as he introduces concepts, defines terms, and presents core legal issues. The
text assumes very little knowledge of the Supreme Court or of the criminal justice
system on the part of its readers. While this makes following the narrative about those on
trial for capital murder easy, the human dimensions do not pack a great deal of
explanatory power that is, narratives about personal histories do not help students
understand the Court's decisions. The extensive, careful consideration of Furman,
Gregg,37 and some of the earlier cases in this narrative are not as well matched by what
follows from McCleskey38 forward.
What more might one want to see in and from CapitalPunishment on Trial? These
are designed to be compact treatments; the longest of these is 184 pages of text (not
including the chronology, bibliographic essay, and index) and the shortest is 125 pages.
Nevertheless, there are a few things that would have made this volume even better.
While mentioning the Baldus study, Oshinsky does not discuss the Court's treatment of
statistics, patterned outcomes, and disparate impact analysis in Equal Protection
adjudication.39 It could also be clearer whether and how disagreements about the
in battles over
constitutionality of the death penalty figured or did not figure
nominations to the Supreme Court. One might also wish that Oshinsky had explained a
bit more about appeals and the appellate process. Finally, although Oshinsky continues
his narrative through Baze v. Rees,40 the 2008 ruling on whether lethal injection
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the treatment of post-McCleskey case law is a
bit disappointing. It is not as full as one would like if students are to understand the state
of the law up to the present time. Were any topics to be added for brief coverage, my
vote would have been for recent case law from Walton,41 Apprendi,42 and Ring43
through Blakely4 4 and Booker,4 5 as a new set of decisions raises questions about the role
of judges and juries in capital sentencing. This would provide one more opportunity to
reflect on the relationship between consistency and fairness in sentencing on the one
hand, and jury discretion and responsiveness to sensational details (potentially
introducing bias and caprice in distinguishing between life in prison and death) on the

36. Oshinsky, supra n. 2.
37. Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
38. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

39. Oshinsky, supra n. 2, at 94-108. See also David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth,
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An EmpiricalStudy of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. &

Criminology 661 (1983).
40. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
41.

Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639 (1990).

42. Apprendi v. NJ, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
43. Ring v. Ariz., 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
44. Blakely v. Wash., 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
45. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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other. Of course, what constitutes adequate counsel in death penalty cases, and the
Court's reluctance to say very much about this, would be another interesting issue.
46
The earliest of these volumes, The Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, was
published in 2007, after Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
DistrictNo. 147 had been accepted for oral argument by the Supreme Court but prior to a
decision. Nevertheless, this engaging text should have considerable staying power, and
the final chapter discussing what has happened as a result of Grutter and Gratz nicely
examines how actors and activists altered their behavior and strategy. Perry has done a
laudable job with Bakke48 and other precedents in the chapter "Bakke to the Future," and
I find this the best of the three volumes under review in terms of understanding the legal
context within which the cases take place. The blend of human-interest stories and legal
analysis works rather well in this volume, although the narrative bogs down some as we
wind our way through the appeals process. Perry has done a good job in treating the
impact of changing personnel on the Court on this issue, on the role of all three branches
in affirmative action, and on shifts in public opinion about affirmative action in response
to administration rhetoric.
There are a few important issues, however, that should have been covered better.
Perry does not make clear that City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. sets the standard of
review at strict scrutiny for state-initiated affirmative action in hiring and contracting
(Marshall's lengthy dissent, acknowledging this settling, is not mentioned).49 Perry does
not touch upon another extremely important and related development, namely the
Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 5's remedial ("prophylactic"50 ) power
and the tension in the years between City of Richmond and Adarand over whether the
federal government might have remedial, affirmative action powers that states lacked.
The Court's curbing of possible legislative responses to what Congress believed to be
persisting issues of discrimination under this section is an important story that impacts
other recent developments in the law and relations between the branches. While § 5
interpretation is a bit complex, I believe students and lay readers could be made to
understand it, and that a treatment of this issue is very important for understanding what
kind of equal protection visions Congress may attempt to secure by acting upon state
actors. Were there more time and space, it would have been useful to hear about the
Court's declining interest in oversight of school districts that were required to design
desegregation plans and the sense, at least on the part of a number of Justices, that
resegregation (absent current discriminatory intent) fails to present a constitutional issue.
David Richards's exploration of Bowers and Lawrence in The Sodomy Cases
provides a very fine treatment of the Court decisions, concurrences, and dissents; the
background of each case; and aftermath. The depth of treatment of the two major cases
and of Romer promotes a strong and rich understanding of these cases richer by
comparison to the crisper and more concise treatment of Furman and Gregg in the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Barbara A. Perry, The Michigan Affirmative Action Cases (U. Press Kan. 2007).
ParentsInvolved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
City ofRichmond, 488 U.S. at 493-498.
See Nev. Dept. ofHum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-728 (2003).

51. Richards, supra n. 32.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009

7

Tulsa Law TULSA
Review, LA
Vol.WREVIEW
45 [2009], Iss. 4, Art. 8

666

[Vol. 45:659

CapitalPunishment on Trial. Like the other works reviewed, Richards provides a wellwritten, engaging, easy-to-read volume. The post-Lawrence chapter considers the likely
fate of same-sex marriage and, briefly, the Right's charge that Lawrence will lead to the
decriminalization of other sexual offenses.52 As noted earlier, Richards also provides the
most romantic narrative about the law of the three authors: we are witness to a
democratizing process and to the Court's increasing recognition of universal human
rights, including recognition of a basic human right to an intimate life. 53 The author's
passions and investment in the outcome of this battle are highly pronounced throughout.
Richards provides an introduction to the history of homosexuality that is more
social history than legal and jurisprudential history; the first chapter begins with the
construction of homosexuality in Western culture. This is a broad-brush mise-en-scene
for these series books. An intelligent and curious reader would like to better understand
the treatment of homosexuality in American law and the kinds of prosecutions persons
charged with same-sex sodomy faced under various state laws in the many years before
Griswold54 begins building the case for privacy. And, although the treatment of Bowers,
Lawrence, and Romer is extremely good, this careful, close attention to arguments and
counterarguments on the bench doesn't tend to carry over as well into the coverage of
surrounding or ensuing material, where Richards sometimes reverts to the wide lens.
Invoking not only jurists and legal scholars (Learned Hand, John Hart Ely, Cass
Sunstein) but also Shakespeare, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Adrienne Rich, Richards,
unlike the other Kansas authors considered here, is involved in express advocacy.
It is interesting to note that Justice Lewis Powell plays a central but somewhat
troubling role in all three case histories. Powell, author of Bakke, stood with the
conservatives on part of the opinion and with the liberals on another part. Thus, the only
thing holding Bakke together was Powell's vision of the law: no racial quotas, but race as
a plus factor among others (as used by his alma mater, Harvard) could pass muster since
diversity could be a compelling state interest. When this understanding was finally put to
the test twenty-seven years later, Grutter and Gratz seem to reveal that Bakke is still
good constitutional law. On capital punishment, Oshinsky notes that Justice Powell,
when asked in retirement whether he would go back in time to change one of his votes
on the Court, replied, "Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp." 55 It is also well-known that, in an
interview following his retirement, Powell who had originally considered casting his
vote to overturn the antisodomy statute at issue in Bowers but who changed his mind,
providing the pivotal vote upholding the Georgia law - said, "I think I probably made a
mistake in the Hardwick case."56 While the damage done in Bowers has been erased in
large measure through Lawrence (overturning Bowers), McCleskey still stands as a
virtually insurmountable barrier to a convicted inmate of color attempting to argue that

52. Id. at 157-176.
53. Id at 177-184.
54.

Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

55. Oshinsky, supra n. 2, at 107.
56. Nat Hentoff, Village Voice, Infamous Sodomy Law Struck Down: What Was the State of Georgia Doing

in Hardwick's Bedroom?, http://www.villagevoice.com/1998-12-22/news/infamous-sodomy-law-strck-down/
(Dec. 22, 1998) (remarks made in response to questioning at New York University Law School). See also
Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, CrucialCentrist Justice,Dies at 90, 147 N.Y. Times Al (Aug. 26, 1998).
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there has been an Equal Protection violation because of racial patterns in application of
the death penalty. Sometimes, revisitings are eloquent: Justice Blackmun's dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins renouncing tinkering with the "machinery of
death," at least provided some support, through his rationale, for opponents of the death
penalty. 57 Powell's musings after leaving the bench did no such thing.
With any luck, the students who read Landmark Law Cases volumes such as the
recent ones by Oshinsky, Perry, and Richards will have some idea what the competing
principles are, where they stand, and why. Historical institutionalists and students of law
and American political development certainly hope that students will come away with a
sense that, overall, the Court's trajectory is neither simply the sum of personal
preferences of individual Justices who come and go nor one of ad hoc decision making
on matters of such great import.
These volumes in the Landmark Cases series do not break new ground in
interpreting the cases under review, nor were they designed to do so. They are very good
introductions. They will work best when, in the hands of faculty who use one or two on a
syllabus, they are set within a framework for examining the Court's place in the political
system or in the development of a specific policy controversy, the relationship between
the branches, how to understand the Court, and even why we should regard particular
cases as landmarks other than the fact that they may defuse controversy for a time, or
that we like or dislike the results.

57. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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